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Abstract
Analysis of the Flight Management Attitudes and Safety Survey by Bernadette Gatien, 
October 2004.
The Flight Management Attitudes and Safety Survey (FMASS) (Sexton, Helmreich, 
Wilhelm & Merritt, 2001) is one of the most widely used measures of pilot safety 
attitudes in research and applied settings. Previous research has shown that earlier 
versions of the FMASS, (CMAQ and FMAQ) are reliable and valid measures of flight 
management attitudes. However there does not appear to be any independent research 
conducted on the psychometric properties of the FMASS. The current study assessed the 
reliability and validity of the FMASS. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was 
performed on the FMASS, using data from a sample of Canadian airline pilots. Results 
indicated the data were not able to confirm the proposed factor structure. In addition, 
results showed poor internal consistency. The results of the current study indicated that 
more research is needed on the psychometric properties.
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Analysis of the Flight Management and Safety Survey 
Human factors play a significant role in safety of employees in various high 
reliability occupations and industries including nuclear power, offshore oil and aviation 
(Yule, 2003). Ihgh reliability occupations are defined as those, which operate in 
extremely dangerous and high-risk environments with consistent safe performance 
(Roberts, 1993). The study of human factors has been instrumental in developing our 
understanding of human error as a causal factor in organizational disasters, accidents, as 
well as iiijury and illness rates. There are various different factors that contribute to 
accidents such as job characteristics (e.g. physical workload), equipment, work 
environment, and personal characteristics (Wickens, Gordon & Liu, 1998). Personal 
characteristics include aspects that are physical and psychological. One specific 
psychological characteristic that is studied and researched in relation to human error and 
accidents is attitudes towards safety (Wickens, Gordon & Liu, 1998).
Research on attitudes towards flight management safety has contributed greatly to 
our understanding of how and why aviation accidents occur. One way that attitudes 
towards flight safety are studied is via questiormaires or surveys. The most commonly 
used measure of flight safety attitudes is the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
(FMAQ) (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998) and its variants. The Flight Management Attitudes 
and Safety Survey (FMASS) (Sexton, Wilhelm, Helmreich, Merritt, & Klinect, 2001) is 
one of the newest versions of the FMAQ and is currently used in the industry as an 
attitude assessment and training evaluation tool. Previous research on the development 
and psychometric properties of the FMASS is hmited and as such, the purpose of the
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current study is to examine the reliability and validity of the measure. In order to fully 
understand how attitudes are related to flight aviation safety some background 
information on aviation safety, accidents and the evolution of the study of human error 
and attitudes is provided.
Aviation Sa/èty
During the late 1970's, researchers at National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) began to investigate the exact nature of accidents within aviation. In the United 
States the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) followed NASA's lead and 
started investigating the human error played in all aviation accidents. Investigators 
examined how pilot behaviour within the cockpit was related to the number of aviation 
accidents. Until that time, the focus on improving flight safety was on technical aspects 
of flight such as working with equipment and improving technical skills. Investigators 
from NASA's Ames Research Center stepped away from the traditional process of 
looking at the human and interface design problems and began to investigate the 
behavioural interactions between pilots (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Information on 
pilot behaviour within the cockpit was gathered using a structured interview developed 
by BiUings, Lauber, and Cooper (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). The interview was 
designed to gather speciGc information from pilots about how crews operated and the 
types of errors pilots made (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). During this time, a different 
group of researchers were investigating the causes of flight accidents that occurred 
between 1968 and 1976. They found that pilot error was primarily the result of 
breakdowns in two specihc areas, team communication and coordination (Helmreich &
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Foushee, 1993). Specifically, problems also arose in areas such as workload 
management, task delegation, situation awareness, leadership, using available resources 
including crewmembers and the use of manuals. A number of problems related to the 
building and maintenance of effective team relationships also became apparent 
(Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Break downs in these areas lead researchers to investigate 
the non-technical skills required as part of safe flight management.
Aon-rgcAmzcaZ .SMk
Non-technical skills refer to proficiency in critical thinking and interpersonal 
relationships, which are not directly related to the mechanical or technical aspects of 
flight. Non-technical skills include communication, teamwork and decision-making, 
interpersonal communication, situational awareness, leadership, decision making, and 
stress recognition (Helmreich &  Foushee, 1993). Non-technical skills are key elements in 
maintaining a high level of safety within aviation. Effective communication is one of the 
most critical non-technical skills and serves at least five safety critical functions (Kanki 
& Palmer, 1993). Communication provides information, maintains attention to task 
monitoring, operates as a management tool, establishes predictable behaviour patterns 
and establishes personal relationships (Kanki & Palmer, 1993). Poor communication 
behaviours in and out of the cockpit cause problems by creating confusion and 
misunderstandings, a lack of attention to the current situation, a lack of leadership and 
direction, opportunities for unpredictable behaviour patterns and interpersonal strain 
between the parties involved (Kanki &  Palmer, 1993).
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In 1997, a near miss incident occurred where a pilot radioed his current position, 
plan for approach and landing destination in to air traffic control, and noticed moments 
later another plane on the same flight path. The pilot of the second plane came over the 
radio and immediately accused the first pilot of not following procedures. The argument 
escalated to the point where the owner of the airport was forced to interrupt and take 
control of the situation (Salven, 2002). This is a good example of improper 
communication behaviours (screaming and name calling) creating interpersonal strain 
between pilots and ultimately, aggravating a dangerous situation (Salven, 2002). Proper 
communication behaviours from both pilots could have minimized the length of time it 
took to resolve the situation.
Proper decision-making is also considered a crucial aspect of flight safety. Poor 
decision-making appears to have caused a considerable number of military and civilian 
aviation accidents (Diehl, 1991, as cited in Orasanu, 1993). Decision-making within the 
cockpit is a process that involves careful consideration in three specific areas: assessment 
of the current and future situation, risk assessment, and deciding among options 
(Orasanu, 1993). Often times crews are faced with dangerous or high risk situations and 
are forced to handle various situational factors that influence the decision making 
process. Effective decision-making on behalf of flight crews requires a combination of 
factors including: situational and self-awareness, careful planning, having a collective 
understanding of the current situation, and using all available resources (Orasanu, 1993). 
Proper decision-making within the cockpit is influenced by a number of factors, such as
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familiarity with the current problem or situation, urgency of the situation, and how well 
the problem is defined (Orasanu, 1993).
A considerable amount of research exists on the process of decision-making and 
the different types of decisions (Orasanu 1993). However, more information is needed on 
the types of knowledge, skills and abilities required to meet the demands of decision­
making within the cockpit. Furthermore, more defined and standardised performance 
criteria for evaluation purposes must be developed. The fact that there is a lack of 
research and knowledge in the area suggests that there may be pilots who possibly lack 
the proper skills, abilities, and most importantly, the right attitudes that result in 
appropriate making good flight management decisions.
Accidgnff and Won-rgcAnical
It is important to explain how non-technical skills are related to accidents and 
how skills in non-technical areas such as leadership, communication, stress recognition, 
situation awareness are critical to flight safety. The best way to do this is through 
examples of accidents in which non-technical skills played in a critical role in the saving 
or fatality of flight crew and passengers. The crash of United Airlines flight 232 in Sioux 
City, Iowa is one of the most discussed aviation accidents because it is a textbook case 
where effective non-technical skills in communication, leadership and teamwork 
contributed to the survival of 111 of its 296 passengers and crew.
While enroute to Chicago an engine malfunctioned causing a complete 
breakdown of the aircrafts hydraulic system leaving the pilots with little steering ability. 
Even though there were previous occurrences of aircrafts losing their hydraulic systems.
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no emergency checklists were available for the pilots leaving them to handle the situation 
using what resources were available to them. Effective communication, teamwork and 
leadership between the pilots and air traffic control, flight attendants and passengers, 
allowed for a clear plan of action and control over the situation. A quick response, clear 
communication and a calm air tragic control officer communication enabled air traffic 
control to clear a runway, and provide the pilots with the information they needed in 
order to find a safe place to land the plane and alert the necessary medical persoimel. 
Effective communication allowed the flight attendants to properly prepare passengers 
including over 30 children for the emergency landing (Haynes, 1991). Furthermore, open 
communication between crew and passengers lead to the critical discovery that one of the 
passengers was a pilot with a considerable number of flying hours on the exact aircraft 
they were on, and was capable of assisting the cockpit crew in controlling the aircraft.
The teamwork between the pilots and assisting passenger allowed the cockpit crew to 
maintain some control in what appeared to be uncontrollable situation. Despite a 
complete lack of emergency protocol the pilots and crew were able to land the aircraft 
without total loss of life. Without the proper non-technical skills and attitudes towards 
communication, leadership and teamwork, investigators felt that there would have a 
greater loss of life (Kilroy, 2004).
In 1972, an Eastern Airlines crew flew their aircraft into the ground of the Florida 
Everglades. The crash was die direct result of their preoccupation with a malfunctioning 
landing gear indicator (Kayten, 1993). All three crewmembers focused their attention on 
the malfunctioning indicator light and paid no attention to their position or proximity to
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the ground. While the National Transportation Safety Board noted that the entire crew 
was preoccupied with the failing indicator light, the report highlighted that it was captain 
who failed to ensure that one of the pilots was maintaining the proper position of the 
aircraft (Kayten, 1993). These accidents and many others clearly demonstrate how proper 
non-technical skills can lead to positive or disastrous results in an emergency situation. 
Non-TecAnfcoZ S&iZZf and Training
During the early 1970's, the training individuals received was thought to be 
insu^cient and did not provide the necessary knowledge and skills to ensure proper 
flight deck management. Consequently, crew training content was dissected and 
examined for flaws or gaps, thought to be related to the incidence of human error. A 
number of changes to training programs were made, including the incoiporation of "Crew 
Concept Training” (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993, p 7), which included simulator 
exercises and revisions to flight manuals. Despite these changes and small improvements 
in cockpit performance, crews received little instruction and guidance on how to perform 
as a team (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). This prompted the aviation industry to gather 
and discuss recent research findings and concerns in the context of the current and 
ongoing trend in human error. It became evident from the meeting that industry experts 
still had serious concerns regarding the human element of aviation accidents despite a 
number of advances in technology and changes made to training programs (Helmreich & 
Foushee, 1993). Researchers and industry experts immediately began to develop formal 
management processes or systems designed to address the specific human and team
Analysis of the FMASS 12 
errors commonly made by cockpit crews and placed issues around technical skills on the 
back burner.
John Lauber was first to coin the term "Cockpit Resource Management", which 
has since been changed to Crew Resource Management (CRM), but it was Frank 
Hawkins of Royal Dutch Airlines that pioneered resource management in general. CRM 
is defined as the process of "using all available resources, information, equipment and 
people, to achieve safe and efficient flight operations" (Lauber, 1984, p. 20). The first 
CRM training program developed for the aviation industry was based on Elwyn Edwards' 
SHEL model of interaction between software (documented operations), hardware 
(physical resources), environment (external context of the system) and liveware (human 
operators and crew members) (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Edwards' model was later 
expanded to include a trans-cockpit authority gradient, or TAG, which means ±at 
captains must create the best possible working relationship with other crewmembers 
while at the same time maintaining a balance in authority (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). 
Over the next few years more research was conducted and Edwards' model was used as 
the foundation for developing the CRM programs that are now an industry standard.
Effective CRM ensures that crewmembers learn appropriate information and 
skills related to leadership, effective team formation, maintenance, problem solving, 
decision-making and situation awareness (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Essentially, 
resource management programs target pilots' skills and abilities related to the non­
technical aspects of flight such as communication. During the 1980's, a number of 
different CRM training programs were developed and delivered to pilots around the
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United States. CRM training focused on how pilots' attitudes impact their behaviours and 
thus have an impact on flight deck performance. One of the main goals of CRM training 
is to change negative attitudes toward the non-technical aspects of flight management.
For example pilots have the ability to demonstrate effective communication but some 
choose not to because of their attitude towards communication, hierarchy or teamwork 
with other crewmembers.
At this time, researchers and industry experts noted the importance of individuals' 
attitudes towards using non-technical skills as a crucial part of flight management. The 
perspective that the industry and aviation researchers have taken is that the attitudes 
towards these non-technical skills is equally as important to flight management as 
mastering skill performance in areas such as communication, teamwork and decision­
making. As a result of this focus on non-technical skills and the attitudes towards them, 
one of the many goals of CRM became changing negatively held attitudes towards non­
technical skills into positive ones. Most current CRM programs focus on changing 
attitudes to support key non-technical skills such as proper communication behaviours, 
situation awareness, leadership, stress recognition and decision-making (e.g., Flin, 1995; 
Lubnau, Okray, 2001).
JVon-rgcA/ucol sMZs wwf
Non-technical skills such as proper communication, decision making, leadership 
and situational awareness are critical group factors that influence flight safety, but 
attitudes towards these non-technical factors also play a critical role in whether or not an 
individual intends to engage in proper CRM behaviours. Unfortunately, unlike technical
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and mechanical failures, breakdowns in non-technical skills remain a common theme in 
the literature on aviation accident statistics. Sixty to 80 percent of aviation accidents are 
the result of human error (Foushee, 1984; Freeman & Simon, 1991). More recent 
statistics indicate that non-technical flight crew performance was the primary cause in 
67% of worldwide hull loss' aviation accidents, while airplane failure was the primary 
cause of only 12 % and weather in only 10% of all accidents (Boeing 2002 Statistical 
Summary, 2003).
It is possible that the CRM's failure to significantly reduce the incidence of 
human error related accidents is due to the diverse types of CRM training and the lack of 
a match between training requirements and what is delivered. Currently, no guidelines or 
set industry standards exist for implementing CRM training, nor are there guidelines or 
industry standards about the exact content of CRM training. Airlines can develop and 
implement a tailored form of CRM training that is specific to their needs using whatever 
methods they choose. Although this seems beneficial, it is difficult to ensure that true 
CRM concepts and underlying psychological theories are being taught and accepted. The 
lack of standardization or agreement over the exact content and delivery of CRM training 
has lead to inadequate and "atheoretical" training programs (Salas et al., 1999 p. 163).
A m^or limitation of the literature on CRM concepts is the lack of both clear 
dehnitions and a theoretical foundation for flight management attitudes. SpeciGcally, 
there is a lack of discussion on the theoretical basis behind how flight management 
attitudes are formed, changed and related to behaviour in the cockpit. Part of the
' Hull Loss -  A term used by the NTSB and the FAA in which "An aircraA damaged to the extent that it is
not economically feasible to repair it. This includes aircraft destroyed or missing fwww.airsafe.com. 
retrieved January 30,2004).
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theoretical foundation for CRM is based on theories in teamwork and group processes 
which are clearly discussed in the literature; however this is not the case when looking at 
the theory behind attitudes and flight management. One of the main principles underlying 
CRM is that it attempts to change and adapt crewmembers' attitudes toward specific non­
technical skills; however, research studies in this area fail to explain the attitude theory 
underlying their process of changing "unsafe" behaviours. Without a known or strong 
theoretical foundation, it is difficult to know whether or not the CRM training is actually 
tapping into pilots' safety attitudes and effectively changing them in a positive direction.
Attitudes are not overtly observable, and must, therefore, be measured using 
either indirect methods such as behavioural observation or direct methods such as surveys 
or questionnaires (Aqen, 1991). The flight management attitudes questionnaire (FMAQ) 
(Helmreich, Merritt, Sherman, Gregorich, & Wiener, 1993) is the most commonly used 
measure of CRM attitudes within the aviation industry. It is predominately used to 
evaluate the current status of safety attitudes and as a training evaluation tool (e.g., Salas, 
Fowlkes, Stout, & Milanovich, 1999). The original FMAQ was developed to specifically 
measure coc^ir management attitudes and was therefore, referred to as the Cockpit 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMA()) (Helmreich, 1984). It contained a total of 
25 Idkert scale items intended to measure attitudes towards non-technical skills such as 
communication, and stress recognition and organisational hierarchies. Example items 
include: "Casual conversion in the cockpit during periods of low workload can improve 
crew performance" and "Pilots should feel obligated to mention their own psychological
Analysis of the FMASS 16 
stress or physical problems to other cockpit crew personnel before or during a flight" 
(Helmreich, 1984, p.587).
In 1988, a revised version of the CMAQ was developed because the existing 
version did not account for cross-cultural attitudes (Gregorich, Helmreich, &  Wilhelm, 
1990). A total of six items, which did not contribute to the predictive validity of CMAQ, 
were replaced with six new items. Gregorich, Helmreich and Wilhelm (1990), conducted 
an exploratory factor analysis of the revised CMAQ scale and initially found a four-factor 
solution however, further examination of their results concluded there were only three 
stable factors. Factor one consisted of items relating to Communication and Coordination 
(e.g., "Each crew member should monitor other crew members for signs of stress or 
fatigue and should discuss the situation with the crew member"). Factor two was 
identified by items related to attitudes towards Command and Hierarchy of the cockpit 
(e.g., "Crew members should not question the decisions or actions of the captain except 
when they threaten the safety of the flight"). Factor three includes items related to 
attitudes towards Recognition of Stress Effects (e.g., "My decision making ability is as 
good in emergencies as in routine flying situations") (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 
1990).
When CRM was exported to other countries other than the United States, CRM 
safety attitudes were measured and researchers found that CMAQ did not maintain 
acceptable levels of validity and reliability, even though the levels of reliability and 
validity reported in U.S Samples is questionable (Gregorich, Helmreich & Wihelm,
1990). CMAQ items that correlated and loaded on specific subscales were no longer
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doing so with a sample of Korean pilots (Helmreich, & Merritt, 1998). The authors found 
the existing version of the CMAQ did not take into account differences in national 
culture. This was a significant Hnding, resulting in the first cross-cultural study of safety 
attitudes (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998) and development of the Flight Management 
Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ).
The FMAQ was developed as an extension to the CMAQ, containing all of the 
original CMAQ items in addition to new items that were based on Hofstede's (1982) four 
dimensions of national culture (power distance, individualism, collectivism, uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity-femininity) (Hehnieich & Merritt, 1998). These new items are 
said to measure work values thereby reflecting cross-cultural aspects of flight 
management attitudes. Items related to pilots' attitudes toward automation were also 
added to the survey. The original version of the FMAQ contained 82 Likert scale items, 
designed to measure pilot attitudes towards command, communication, stress, rules, 
automation, organisational climate and work values (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). The 
questionnaire has since been revised including the FMAQ 2.0 international version and 
the FMAQ 2.1 USA/Anglo version.
Following further research and application of the FMAQ 2.1, an additional 
version was developed, based on the idea that the current version was too long and 
required too much time to complete. The result was a shorter version termed the Flight 
Management Attitudes Safety (Short) Survey (FMASS) (Sexton et al, 2001). A factor 
analysis was used as a data reduction technique to determine which factors within the
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FMAQ that had the highest level of predictive validity and reliability and should be kept 
in the FMASS (Sexton et al., 2001).
The FMASS contains four factors: sa^fy cwZturg, which is defined as "the extent 
to which individuals perceive a genuine and proactive commitment to safety by their 
organisation" (Sexton et al., 2001). The second factor is yob nthfudg.;, which are defined 
as "the level of satisfaction with the organisation and the individual's reactions to his or 
her job experience". Tgomwor  ̂is the third factor and is defined as "the level of 
satisfaction with the quality of teamwork and cooperation experienced with other crew 
members, gate agents, ramp personnel, flight attendants, dispatch, maintenance, and crew 
scheduling” (Sexton et al., 2001). The final factor is termed stress recognition and is 
defined as "the extent to which individuals acknowledge personal vulnerability to 
stressors such as fatigue, personal problems and emergency situations” (Sexton et al., 
2001, p. 5-9).
Previous research using the original CMAQ (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 
1990) indicates that there are three stable factors and "good" reliabilities for each of the 
factors (p. 685). The reliability of these scales can be disputed given that the reported 
Cronbach's alpha coefGcients ranged from .47 to .67, a strong indication of very poor or 
low reliability. Furthermore, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) results indicate factor 
loadings ranging from .03 to .67 (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990). Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001) state that factor loadings of less than .32 are considered poor, 
accounting for less than 20 percent of overlapping variance, and loadings above .63 as 
very good, accoimting for at least 40 percent of overlapping variance.
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Sexton et al. (2001) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on the FMASS and 
conGrmed the four-factor solution as suggested by Merritt (1996, as cited in Sexton et al., 
2001). In addition, they were able to confirm the factor structure across samples taken 
from Asia, Northern Europe and South America. Results of the study showed that three 
of the four factors, safety culture, job attitudes and teamwork, were correlated. Sexton 
and Klinect (2001) report that although the job attitudes and safety culture subscales are 
highly correlated (.68), they measure separate and distinct constructs. Factor loadings for 
the FMASS varied with the lowest value of .28 and the highest value of .77. Sexton et al., 
(2001) describe the Gt of the data as "superior", but only report two Gt indices, the TLI 
(.986) and the RMSEA (.053). These numbers do indicate a good GtGng model however; 
models with good Gt should have acceptable Gt across a number indices (Loehlin, 1987).
Internal consistency coefGcients for each of the scales ranged from .64. to.81.
The most commonly used measure of internal consistency or reliability is Cronbach's 
alpha and scales are considered to have an acceptable level of reliability if the Cronbach's 
alpha reaches above .80 (Bryman & Cramer, 1994). This indicates that the FMASS has 
low reliability within each of its subscales. Furthermore, it suggests that it is not 
measuring responses along a consistent or reliable psychological construct.
Despite its wide spread acceptance and extensive use as a safety atGtudes 
measure, as well as a training evaluaüon tool, there is only a small amount of empirical 
evidence to demonstrate and support the publicized validity and reliability of the 
FMASS. The current study appears to be the Grst independent analysis of the FMASS. 
Both the FMAQ and FMASS are available to various airlines and the public for use in
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researching flight management attitudes. Furthermore, these scales have been adapted 
and used as attitude assessment tools in other high reliability occupations such as 
medicine and offshore oil. Flin, Fletcher, McGeorge, Sutherland, & Patey (2003) used an 
adapted version of the CMAQ called the Operating Room Management Attitudes 
Questionnaire (ORMAQ). The ORMAQ measures stress, hierarchy, teamwork and error 
and attitudes toward the organisation. Results of the study by Flin et al. (2003) found the 
subscales to have poor internal consistency as indicated by the Cronbach alphas ranging 
from .18 to .54. Due to very low inter-item correlations no exploratory factor analysis 
was possible and previous research does not discuss a factor structure for the scale (Flin 
et al., 2(X)3).
The rationale for conducting the current study is that there is a gap in the literature 
on the psychometric properties, specifically the reliability and validity, of the FMASS. 
The authors of the scale, Sexton et al. (2001), recognize the need for further scale 
development of the FMASS, yet an independent analysis of the scale has yet to be done. 
Research investigating the reliability and validity of the FMASS does not appear to 
extend past research conducted by the authors. Furthermore the reliability and validity of 
previous versions (CMAQ and FMAQ) of the FMASS are questionable suggesting that 
the FMASS may not be a reliable or valid measure of flight management attitudes. This 
has serious implications for both research and the industries that use the FMASS or 
modified versions of it. These industries include aviation maintenance, offshore oil and 
medicine. Without a reliable and valid measure of the constructs considered the backbone 
behind flight management (safety culture, job attitudes, teamwork and stress recognition).
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companies may not be getting an accurate assessment of their organisation's flight 
management attitudes. Additionally an invalid and unreliable measure could impact their 
assessment of whether or not the CRM training they have implemented has had the 
desired impact on attitudes. Industries who use this scale assume that there is high level 
of accuracy in what it claims to measure, and as such is important that researchers 
developing and providing this tool to the industry have a high level of confidence that 
their scale measures what it says it measures.
Linking flight management attitudes to performance is still a relatively new area 
of research within aviation and few researchers have undertaken the task. Sexton and 
Klinect (2001) conducted a study using two subscales of the FMASS, to investigate the 
connection pilots' attitudes towards safety culture and job attitudes to performance on 
Line Operated Safety Audits (LOSA). Line Operated Safety Audits are a behavioural 
evaluation tool where a subject matter expert collects data on flight management 
behaviours during a flight (Sexton et al., 2001). Results of the study showed that pilots 
who reported positive safety culture and job attitudes trapped more errors, made fewer 
errors, and had better overall performance than those pilots who reported negative 
attitudes as judged by the subject matter experts. If  the FMASS is not a reliable and valid 
measure of attitudes towards safety culture, job attitudes, teamwork and stress 
recognition, the results of the study are problematic and not an accurate reflection of the 
connection between flight management attitudes and performance. The current study had 
one main objective: To independently examine the psychometric properties of the
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A total of seven hundred and twenty six pilots completed the FMASS for a 
response rate of 75%. Participation was voluntary and completed following CRM training 
sessions (see Appendix A). This sample consisted of approximately nine bases located in 
various cities across Canada. After the data were screened for outliers the sample 
included a total of 390 Captains and 286 First Officers, with 666 males, 27 females, and 
33 who did not indicate gender (N = 726).
A total of 24 French surveys were excluded from the analysis due to a lack of 
empirical evidence to support the validity and reliability of the French version of the 
FMASS. Occupational titles including: managers, instructors and those participants 
categorized as "other" were excluded from the analysis, because of a lack of research 
available to support this version of the survey's use with a sample other than pilots. Table 
1 presents descriptive statistics for the continuous demographic variables. Table 2 
presents descriptive statistics for the categorical demographic variables.
7
Dgfcnprivg Aoriftzcs Variobkr
Participant Demographics Mean SD N
Number of Years at Organisation 8.2 6.41 750
Number of Years in Aviation 16.9 7.41 678
Number of Years on Aircraft Type 5.56 6.45 681
ToAZg 2




















First OfGcer 286 39.4
Pilot Status





Dash 8 489 67.4
F28 106 14.6
The version of the FMASS used in the current study contains a total of 70 items .̂ 
Twenty- five of those items make up the four factors, while the remaining items are not 
included in the proposed structure. These items are considered to provide important 
qualitative information to various stakeholders within the industry and are included as 
part of the survey (Sexton et al., 2001).
 ̂A revised version of the scale has since been developed and is available (Sexton et al., 2001).
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The FMASS requires participants to complete three sections. The first section, 
(Section A), asks participants to evaluate their level of satisfaction with different aspects 
of flight operations (e.g., quality of new hire training) using a five point Likert scale, 
ranging from "A" very low to "E" very high. The second section, (Section B), asks 
participants to rate the quality of teamwork and cooperation with various other flight 
management personnel (e.g., gate agents) using a five point Likert scale, ranging from 
"A" very low to "E" very high. Section three, (Section C), asks participants to provide 
ratings of items also using a five point Likert scale ranging from "A" disagree strongly, to 
"E" agree strongly. Sample items include: "I am proud to work for this organisation" and 
"My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I  expressed them to management". 
The FMASS technical report (Sexton et al., 2(X)1) does not indicate a total scale 
reliability coefficient; however, Cronbach alphas are reported for each subscale (safety 
culture a = .78, job attitudes o= .81, teamwork = .75, and stress recognition o= .64). 
Frocgffwrg
An archival data set provided by a local organisation was used in the current 
study. The organisation was responsible for all data collection procedures and proper 
maintenance of obtained data.
Data
Using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 10.0 (SPSS, 
1999), the data were cleaned by examining minimum and maximum response values, 
ranges, means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, and standardized scores. Cases 
with incorrect data were corrected by cross-referencing with the actual questionnaires and
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cases considered outliers were deleted from further analyses. Outliers were defined as 
cases having a z score of 3.5 or higher. Multivariate outliers were checked using 
Mahalanobis distance and none were found. A total of six variables had a skew value 
above 2 and a kurtosis value above 6; however, all but one of these items are omitted 
from the factor structure (Wilhelm, Helmreich & Merritt, 2001) as they are considered 
qualitative items. Item 27 ("I am less effective when stressed or fatigued") was negatively 
skewed, with a value of -2.37, but due to the robustness of the statistical techniques, and 
the large sample size, skew was not considered to have a signiGcant effect on the Gndings 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using maximum likelihood estimation 
was performed on the data using EQS 6.1 for Windows (Bentier & Wu, 2004) in order to 
confirm the proposed factor structure indicated in the FMASS report. With CFA, a good 
Gtting model is indicated by the comparative, proportion of variance accounted and 
parsimony 6t indices provided by the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The 
following Gt indices were examined in the current CFA:
1. Root Mean Square Error of ApproximaGon (RMSEA) -  is a comparative Gt index 
that estimates the lack of Gt in a model compared to a perfect or saturated model; it is 
able to account for model parsimony and it is able to detect improperly speciGed 
models and is oAen cited within the literature (Tabachnick & FideG, 2001). Values of 
less than .06 indicate a good GtGng model.
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2. Comparative Fit Index (CFl) -  is a comparative Gt index that assesses Gt in 
comparison to other models using a non-central chi-square distribuGon. Values higher 
than .95 indicate a good fitting model.
3. Normed Fit Index (NFI) -  is a Gt index developed by BenGer-Bonett (1980) to 
evaluate the estimated model by companng chi-square values from the model to the 
independence model (Tabachnick &  Fidell, 2001). A value greater than .9 is 
considered to be a good Gtting model.
4. Goodness of Gt index (GFI) -  is a Gt index that indicates the proporGon of vanance 
accounted for by examining the properGes of the sample and estimated correlaGon 
and covanance matnces (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Similar to the NFI good GtGng 
models will have a GFI of at least .9.
5. Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) -  is a fit index based on residuals 
and examines the average difference between the observed vanances and covanances 
and the estimated vanances and covanances (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). A small 
RMR value, less than .08, indicates a good GtGng model.
Following the CFA, an exploratory factor analysis was performed to examine the factor 
structure of the FMASS. Internal consistency values (Cronbach alpha coeGicients) for the 
overall scale as well as each subscale were also computed. A correlaGon matrix generated 
coirelaGons between each of the items and each of the subscales of the FMASS.
Results
A CFA was performed using maximum likelihood esGmaGon and was unable to confirm 
the proposed four-factor soluGon. IniGal CFA results indicate a poor Gt to the data; Table 
3 summanzes the Gt indices wherein all were below the cut off values of .90 and above
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.06. All factor loadings were significant atp < .01 and values ranged from .035 to .755 
(see Table 4). A total of three variables have factor loadings below .32 as highlighted in 
Table 4.
Fit /ndZcas Proposed 4 Factor FMÆ55 Mode/
Fit hidices Proposed 4 Factor Model






Chi-square 1064.56 (df = 269)
Table 4
Standardized Factor Loadings fo r  FMASS Items
Factor Loadings
Item Safety Job Teamwork Stress
Culture Attitudes Recognition
1. The managers in flight operations listen to 
us and care about our concerns .697
2. My suggestions about safety would be 
acted upon if I  expressed them to 
management .735
3. Management will never compromise safety 
concerns for profitability .431
4. I  am encouraged by my supervisors and 
coworkers to report any unsafe conditions I 
observe .640
5. I  know the proper channels to report my 
safety concerns .534
6. I  am satisfied with Chief pilot and 
assistant chief pilot availability .035
7. I  am proud to work for this organization 
Pilot morale is high
.758
.569
8. Senior management (VP and above) at this 
airline is doing a good job .721
9. Working here is like being part of a large 
family .532
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Factor Loadings
Item Safety Job Teamwork Stress
Culture Attitudes Recognition
10.1 like my job .556
11. Pilots trust senior management at this
airline .638
12. Teamwork with other cockpit crew
members .387
13. Teamwork with gate agents .324
14. Teamwork with ranq* personnel .219
15. Teamwork with Gight attendants .356
16. Teamwork with dispatch .721
17. Teamwork with maintenance .620
18. Teamwork with crew scheduling .613
19.1 am more likely to make judgement errors
in abnormal situations or emergency
situations .527
20. My decision making ability is as good in
emergencies as in routine flying conditions .552
21.1 am less effective when stressed or
fatigued 222
22. My performance is not adversely affected
by working with an inexperienced or less
capable crewmember .433
23. Personal problems can adversely affect my
performance .488
24. A truly professional crewmember can leave
person  ̂problems behind when flying .449
Inter-factor correlations were examined and results indicate that each of the four 
subscales was signiGcantly correlated, however only safety culture and job attitudes were 
highly correlated (see hgure 1). A third factor analysis was conducted combining the job 
attitudes and safety culture subscale into one factor. The purpose was to test whether or 
not the two subscales were multicollinear and would provide better 6t to (he data as a 
three factor scale. Results not only showed poor fit to the data, but indicated worse Gt 
than the original four factor model, suggesting that the subscales are highly related but 
separate constructs (see Table 5).
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Chi-square 1201.49 (df = 272)
The subscales had only a moderate level of internal consistency. The Cronbach 
alpha for each of the subscales ranged 6om low to acceptable. Cronbach alphas for each 
subscale and the entire scale were as follows: safety culture a = .63, job attitudes a = .79, 
teamwork a = .68, stress recognition u = .59, entire scale a = .68. Not surprisingly, items 
"I am satisfied with Chief pilot and assistant chief pilot availability" (SAQ6) and "I am 
less effective when stressed or fatigued" (SCQ27), which had low factor loadings, were 
also items decreasing the alpha coefficients, making their respective subscales less 
reliable. This further supported deleting these items from the scale within the model 
modification stage. In this particular measure, the low reliability coefficients suggest the 
items are a poor measure of the proposed psychological constructs and impacting the 
level of generalizibility.
Model improvemefU. ModiRcation indices provided by EQS were examined to 
determine if the model could be improved. The Wald test suggested freeing the variance 
between item "Level of satisfaction with chief pilot and assistant chief pilot availability" 
(SAQ6) and the safety culture factor. The LaGrange Multiplier test indicated a number of 
modifications that would improve the fit to the data such as fixing the variance between
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variables and factors, however no changes were made on the basis that there was no 
theoretical support for doing so. Alternatively, variable S AQ6 and the variables with low 
factor loadings and low values were deleted on the basis that they were not 
contributing to the current model, possibly causing poor fit to the data. A total of three 
items were deleted: "I am satisfied with Chief pilot and assistant chief pilot availability" 
(SAQ6), " Quality of teamwork and cooperation with ramp persoimel" (SBQ16), "I am 
less effective when stressed or fatigued" (SCQ27), and the analysis was re-run a second 
time. Fit to the data did improve following the deletion of these variables, however the fit 
indices remained below suggested cut-off values (see Table 6).
TohZe d
Fit Indices fo r  Modified FMASS Model
Fit Indices Proposed 4 Factor Model






Chi-square 665.18 (df = 203)
Again, factor loadings and R-squared values were examined and results demonstrated 
that one variable SBQ15 "quality of teamwork with gate agents" was not contributing to 
the overall model. Subsequently, that variable was deleted and another CFA was run. 
Although fit to the data did improve, fit indices were still below the cut-off values. No 
further changes were made to the model.
The current sample was unable to confiim the proposed four-factor solution despite a 
number of changes and modifications to the scale (see Figure 1). This prompted an
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examination of the data using an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in order to fully 
inspect the factor structure and to further investigate the potential multicollinearity of the 
safety culture and job attitudes subscales.
Fining Modlgi o/" FMASS
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Inter-item correlations were examined to determine the suitability for conducting an 
exploratory factor analysis. Having too many low inter item correlations (below .30) 
indicates that there are no factors to analyse. Correlations that are too high (.90) suggest 
multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Results showed that there were
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correlations between items above .30, providing support for the factorability of the data 
and continuation of the exploratory factor analysis. The initial EFA using principal axis 
factoring, oblique rotation and listwise deletion, did not demonstrate a clean four-factor 
solution. A  seven-factor solution was extracted, accounting for a reasonable amount of 
total variance, 40.73 %. Variance accounted for by each of the factors was as follows: 
factor 1 accounted for 19.06 %, factor 2 accounted for 5.58%, factor 3 accounted for 5.04 
%, factor 4 accounted for 3.57%, factor 5 accounted for 3.06%, factor 6 accounted for 
2.40% and factor 7 accounted for 2.03 % of the total variance. Intcrpretability was 
limited to two factors. Factor one contained all of items related to job attitudes and factor 
five contained all of the items related to safety culture. The remaining items did not load 
cleanly on the remaining factors. The rotated pattern matrix showed that the teamwork 
items loaded on three separate factors while the stress recognition items loaded on two 
separate factors. The scree plot indicated a three factor solution further suggesting the 
remaining factors were unstable and should not be interpreted.
Factor loadings from the rotated pattern matrix ranged in value from very poor (-.24) 
to good (.75) (see Table 7) with two factors accounting for less than 30 percent of the 
variance in the variables or items (SCQ26, "Management will never compromise safety 
concerns for profitability" and item SCQ33, "A truly professional crewmember can leave 
personal problems behind when flying"). Results also demonstrated that, while the safety 
culture and job attitude items are significantly correlated, they load on separate factors.
PaZfgm M o f r i x E F A
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FMASS Items Factor Loadings
Safety Culture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. The managers in flight operations listen to
us and care about our concerns -.52
2. My suggestions about safety would be acted
upon if I  expressed them to management -.54
3. Management will never compromise safety
concerns for proGtability -.24
4 .1 am encouraged by my supervisors and
coworkers to report any unsafe conditions I
observe -.47
5 .1 know the proper charmels to report my
safety concerns -.54
6 .1 am satisfied with Chief pilot and assistant
chief pilot availability -.47
Job Attitudes
7 .1 am proud to work for this organization .63
8. Pilot morale is high .68
9. Senior management (VP and above) at this
airline is doing a good job .63
10. Working here is like being part of a large
family .38
11.1 like my job .45
12. Pilots trust senior management at this
airline .67
Teamwork
13. Teamwork with other cockpit crew
members .68
14. Teamwork with gate agents -.66
15. Teamwork with ramp persoimel -.76
16. Teamwork with flight attendants .63
17. Teamwork with dispatch .74
18. Teamwork with maintenance .57
19. Teamwork with crew scheduling .65
Stress Recognition
20.1 am more likely to make judgement errors
in abnormal situations or emergency
situations .66
21. My decision making ability is as good in
emergencies as in routine flying conditions .62
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FMASS Items Factor Loadings
Safety Culture 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
22.1 am less effective when stressed or
fatigued .34
23. My performance is not adversely affected
by working with an inexperienced or less -
capable crewmember .33
24. Personal problems can adversely affect my
performance .75
25. A truly professional crewmember can leave
personal problems behind when flying .28
A second EFA was performed forcing the number of factors to four, given that the 
proposed structure of the FMASS contains four factors. The same extraction type, 
method of rotation and method for dealing with missing data were used. The final 
solution accounted for 31.56% of the variance. Factor one, safety culture, accounted for 
the most amount of variance at 18.80 %. The percentage of variance accounted for by the 
remaining three factors was as follows: Job ufrimdgf accounted for 5.04%, 
accounted for 4.59 % and srrg.yf recogmrion accounted for 3.13% of the variance in the 
total solution.
Although the results of the second EFA demonstrated a slightly cleaner solution, 
there were low loading items and items that were forced to load on different factors from 
the previous EFA. Similar to the first EFA, two items accounted for less than 20% of the 
variance in the item (see Table 7). The items include the same safety culture items as the 
first EFA, "management will never compromise safety for profitability", and a different 
stress recognition item, "I am less effective when stressed or fatigued". Forcing the 
number factors had an impact on the safety culture and stress recognition factors such 
that items which previously loaded on one factor, loaded on a different factor. For
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example, safety culture item, "I know the proper channels to report my safety concerns" 
(SCQ37) was forced to load on the same factor as the stress recognition items where it 
had not previously loaded. Two teamwork items that previously loaded on their own 
factor were forced to load onto the safety culture factor (see Table 9). When the number 
of factors was forced, the results more closely represented the four factors solution 
proposed by Sexton et al. (2001).
&
KomW fotrg/Ti MaZrcr Fowr Factor FFA
FMASS Items Factor loadings
Safety Culture
1. The managers in flight operations listen to us and
1 2 3 4
care about our concerns 
2. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if
-.53
I expressed them to management
3. Management will never compromise safety
-.48
concerns for profitability 
4. I am encouraged by my supervisors and coworkers
-.25
to report any unsafe conditions I observe 
5. I know the proper channels to report my safety
-.51
concerns





7 .1 am proud to work for this organization .64
8. Pilot morale is high
9. Senior management (VP and above) at this airline is
.65
doing a good job .60
10. Working here is like being part of a large family .33
11.1 like my job .45
12. Pilots trust senior management at this airline 
Teamwork
.58
13. Teamwork with other cockpit crew members .48
14. Teamwork with gate agents -.35
15. Teamwork with ramp personnel -.38
16. Teamwork with flight attendants .44
17. Teamwork with dispatch .68
18. Teamwork with maintenance .58
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FMASS Items Factor loadings
Safety Culture 1 2  3 4
19. Teamwork with crew scheduling .50
Stress Recognition
20.1 am more likely to make judgement errors in
abnormal situations or emergency situations .54
21. My decision making ability is as good in
emergencies as in routine flying conditions .54
22.1 am less effective when stressed or fatigued .25
23. My performance is not adversely affected by
worldng with an inexperienced or less capable .40
crewmember
24. Personal problems can adversely affect my
performance .49
25. A truly professional crewmember can leave
personal problems behind when flying .25
Because the current sample contained data from different groups it is possible that 
the results of the study were impacted by group differences. More speciScally, it is 
possible that there were significant differences between bases and between captains and 
first officers that impacted the extent to which the data was able to confirm the four factor 
structure. To deal with this issue of differences between bases, a Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) was conducted looking at whether there were group differences 
between the four largest bases across Canada: Halifax, Toronto and Calgary and 
Vancouver. Only four bases were chosen due to sample size. Results (see Appendix C) 
show that there was a multivariate effect, F  (3, 553) = 11.17, p <.001, for three of the 
four subscales: Safety Culture, Job Attitudes and Teamwork. Post hoc analyses indicate 
that Halifax was significantly different from Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver on the job 
attitudes and safety culture subscale. The impact group differences had on the factor 
structure for each base was not further examined due sample size constraints. The impact
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of group differences between Captains and First Officers was examined using exploratory 
factor analysis. The factor structure for both occupations differed on the number of 
factors such that job attitudes and safety culture items loaded on one factor for the 
Captains. Thus, the results of confirmatory factor analyses were not impacted by the 
group differences between occupations.
Discussion
The current study had one main objective: To independently examine the 
psychometric properties of the FMASS, specifically the validity and internal consistency 
by conGrming the four factor solution proposed by Sexton et al. (2001). A confirmatory 
factor analysis was conducted on the data to confirm that there are four factors to the 
FMASS. The current study was unable to confirm the four-factor solution as proposed by 
Sexton et al. (2001) and the scale had a low level of rehability or internal consistency. 
Initial CFA results indicated poor Gt across mulGple Gt indices, even after various 
modiGcations were made, wherein variables with low factor loadings and low R-squared 
values were deleted from the analyses. ModiGcaGon indices were ignored in the current 
analysis due to the lack of theorehcal support for the suggested changes. Attention was 
speciGcally given to variables with low loadings on the basis that these variables were 
contributing very little to the overall model.
Following the modiGcations, Gt to the data did improve, but not enough to 
indicate a good Gtting model. The current data was unable to obtain an acceptable level 
of Gt, suggesting that the FMASS is not measuring the psychological constructs it was 
intended to measure in the current data set.
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Reliability analysis demonstrated low levels of internal consistency for all of the 
subscales, in addition to a low level of internal consistency for the overall scale. Sexton et 
al. (2001) propose that the FMASS is a reliable measure of four specific components or 
factors of flight management safety attitudes: safety culture, job attitudes, teamwork and 
stress recognition. The FMASS appears to be the only currently available measure of 
flight management attitudes and, as such, is used frequently in both research and ^plied  
settings. Reliability coe^cients ranged for each of the FMASS subscales ranged from 
very low to acceptable, suggesting that the FMASS is not consistently measuring the 
intended constructs across all of the items.
Results of the initial CFA also indicated that two of the FMASS subscales (safety 
culture and job attitudes) were highly correlated. Sexton et al., (2001) maintain that 
although they are highly correlated they are distinct constructs. The current study 
examined this relationship by conducting a CFA combining the two subscales and testing 
a three-factor model. Results showed poor At for the three factor model thus suggesting 
the four factor was more appropriate. Furthermore, an EFA was conducted, which 
demonstrated that safety culture and job attitudes are related, but separate factors 
measuring separate psychological constructs. This appears to be supported by the items 
loading on separate factors, which prompted an examination of the face validity of both 
the safety culture and job attitude subscale. The items appear to be demonstrating some 
level of face validity and measuring the intended constructs. For instance, the safety 
culture items ask respondents to rate their perceptions about the commitment of their 
organisation to safety (e.g., "My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I
Analysis of the FMASS 39 
expressed them to management"). The job attitudes items ask respondents to rate their 
attitudes toward various aspects of their job (e.g., "I am proud to work for this 
organisation"). It is possible that the safety culture and job attitude are highly related but 
distinct concepts. It is also possible that the correlation exists because of the predictive 
relationship between them. In other words, having high perceptions about the level of 
commitment you feel your organisation has toward safety predicts, in part, attitudes 
toward your job such as morale. Given the fact that aviation is a high reliability 
organisation where commitment to safety at all levels of the organisation is critical, it is 
reasonable to assume that high or positive perceptions of organisational commitment to 
safety, would positively impact job attitudes such as morale.
The current study was unable to reproduce previous research and confirm a four- 
factor solution for a number of possible reasons. The most obvious is the lack of 
reliability of the subscales within the current study and the low to moderate levels of 
reliability demonstrated in past research. A scale with a low level of internal consistency 
will not generalize to other samples (Trochim, 2004). Results of the current study showed 
low levels of internal consistency compromising the extent to the current sample could 
reproduce the four-factor solution proposed by Sexton et al. (2001). Furthermore, 
reliability analysis indicates how well a scale is consistently measuring what it was 
intended to measure. The low reliability coefficients found in the current study suggests 
the items are doing a poor job of measuring safety culture, job attitudes, teamwork and 
stress recognition.
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Another reason could be the level of construct validity. The FMASS was 
developed using the FMAQ, which was originally developed from the CMAQ. Although 
the CMAQ has demonstrated a high level of validity in relation to showing a link 
between attitudes and behaviour (see Helmreich, et al., 1989) a number of changes and 
revisions have been made to this original version. Literature on the topic does not clearly 
indicate the process taken to ensure that the tmderlying constructs of safety culture, job 
attitudes, stress recognition and teamwork had high levels of construct validity. From one 
version of the questionnaire to the next there is very little literature available on how the 
items were developed, written and changed from one version to the next. Many of the 
items on the FMASS are poorly worded and double barrelled; for example “I am 
encouraged by my supervisors and co-workers to report any unsafe conditions I may 
observe” (SCQ34). Supervisors and co-workers in organizations do not exist within the 
same chain of command, and typically work under different kinds of pressure. For 
instance, pilots are under an enormous amount of pressure to perform safely every time 
they fly, but supervisors have to contend with pressure from management to be as 
eOicient and productive as possible. It is conceivable that pilots are encouraged by their 
co-workers to report any unsafe condition, but not necessarily encouraged by their 
supervisors. Additionally, section B of the questionnaire requires respondents to rate the 
quality of the level of teamwork and cooperation they have encountered with various 
personnel. Teamwork and cooperation are not one and the same, cooperation is one 
specific aspect of teamwork and as such it would be difficult to assess the two concepts 
with the same items. There are various ways to improve the scale, however the Grst step
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would be to re-evaluate the construct validity and how the scale was developed. Secondly 
there are many ways in which the wording of items could be improved. Specific 
problems with each subscale and ways to improve them are provided below.
It is possible that the FMASS does not work with a Canadian sample for cross 
cultural reasons. This argument is quickly refuted as the psychometric properties of the 
FMASS were examined using samples from North America, Asia, Northern Europe, and 
South America all of which were able to confirm the proposed four factor solution 
(Sexton et al., 2001). Although it is unknown whether the North American sample in 
Sexton et al. (2001) contained Canadian data, it is unlikely that any differences between 
Canada and other North American countries were different enough to cause the failure to 
confirm the proposed factor structure.
SnggggfioMf ybr Z/nprovgrngnr
ConsTrwct Vizln&ry. Given the results of the current study there is considerable 
room for improvement on the FMASS starting with a re-analysis of its construct validity. 
More research needs to be conducted to examine whether the FMASS is actually 
measuring the psychological constructs it is proposing to measure. The FMASS purports 
to measure four underlying psychological constructs however, it is not clear whether the 
subscales included are actually measuring those constructs. For instance, safety culture is 
an extremely broad topic, which has no definitive organisation, only common themes 
(Yule, 2003). In general, safety culture is defined as an organisation's overall shared 
attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviours around safety (Yule, 2003). Sexton et al. (2001) 
define safety culture as the "extent to which individuals perceive a genuine and proactive
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commitment to safety by their organization" (p.3). This definition is only measuring 
perceptions about one aspect of safety culture: commitment. It does not cover other areas 
of safety culture including, espoused values, or beliefs. Because safety culture is such a 
global facet of an organisation it is extremely difficult to measure and when it is being 
measured most often it is actually safety climate not safety culture. Based on the 
operationalisation provided by the authors of the scale it appears this subscale is 
measuring climate not culture.
Safety climate is considered a component of safety culture but is situationally 
based and refers to the perceptions, operations, working practices, and work environment 
at a particular point in time (Yule, 2003). When comparing the current safety culture 
subscale to other measures of safety climate there are notable differences. For instance, 
Flin, Meams, O’Connor and Bryden (2000) found that areas most often measured by 
climate scales include: management/supervision, safety systems, risk, work pressure, and 
competence. When comparing other measures of safety climate to the FMASS safety 
culture subscale a number of differences surface. The current subscale contains only six 
items which is far fewer than many of the other measures (see Flin et al., 2(XX)). 
Furthermore, other measures of safety climate measure a number of areas including those 
mentioned above. As stated within the definition the current scale only measures 
respondents' perceptions of managements' commitment to safety, which is only one part 
of a multi-faceted construct and only covers management. Furthermore, the questionnaire 
requires respondents to comment on the commitment they perceive their "organization"
Analysis of the FMASS 43 
to have; however the items only cover management. Managers are not the only 
employees who contribute to safety culture within an organization.
Improvements to the scale should start with the construct definition by either 
broadening the scope or narrowing it. If the construct definition is broadened more items 
need to be included to cover all of the areas that exist within safety culture. Also, if the 
purpose of the scale is to measure commitment from the entire organisation, more items 
that measure perceptions of other employees' commitment (e.g. co-workers, supervisors) 
should be added. If  the construct definition is narrowed, the definition should be 
renamed and be more specific and state that it only covers one specific aspect of safety 
culture (i.e. management commitment).
The results of the current study has serious potential serious implications for the 
aviation industry. For instance, airlines who use the FMASS as an attitude assessment 
tool and who are not familiar with the concept of safety culture might be mislead into 
thinking that the FMASS is measuring the safety culture of their organisation when in 
fact it is only measuring one specific facet or component.
In the current study, the job attitudes subscale appears to do a better job of 
measuring a psychological construct than the safety culture, teamwork and stress 
recognition subscales. The job attitudes factor is defined as an individual's level of 
satisfaction with the organisation and their reaction to their job experience. Although the 
scale does an acceptable job of measuring the proposed construct there is room for 
improvement beginning with how job attitudes is defined in relation to the items. Job 
attitudes include a number of different facets beyond satisfaction and morale; such as
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attitudes toward commitment (e.g. Fields, 2002), organisational justice (Ford, 2001), job 
involvement (Shore, Newton, & Thorton, 1999). Sexton et al. (2001) does not address 
any of these facets, nor do they provide justification for not including them as part of the 
job attitudes factor. Additionally, the operationalisation provided by Sexton et al. (2001) 
purports to measure satisfaction and morale, but there are three items which do not fall 
under either facet: "I am proud to work for this organisation", "Pilots trust senior 
management at this airline" and "Working here is like being part of a large family".
These items appear to measure commitment and trust, not satisfaction. Another problem 
with a scale is that it requires participants to evaluate job attitudes on behalf of all pilots 
(“pilots trust senior management at this airline”) as well as on behalf of their own 
personal attitudes ("I like my job"). It is possible that a pilot's assessment of their own 
attitude could differ significantly from other pilots within the same organization. 
Furthermore, these items require pilots to make a judgement on the attitudes of pilots 
they are not familiar with, thus bringing into question their suitability for commenting on 
other pilots' level of trust in senior management. The reliability and validity might 
improve if the statements included only personal attitude assessment items.
Although the job attitude scale appears to have an acceptable level of reliability, 
the remaining subscales do not do an acceptable job of reliably measuring the intended 
constmcts and a re-analysis of the theoretical foundation of each subscale is warranted. 
There are a number of problems that exist with the stress recognition scale in that it is 
dealing with a number of various aspects of stress. Upon a closer examination of the 
items within the stress recognition subscale they appear to assess a person's ability to rate
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their performance while dealing with various stressors or stressful situations. Five of the 
six items ask respondents to comment on their own ability to perform, but one item 
requires respondents to comment on crewmembers in general. The construct definition 
states that it deals only with an individual's perception and the perceptions of others or all 
"pilots" within the organisation, thus some of the items do not reflect the construct 
definition.
Additionally the stressors respondents are required to comment on appear random 
and unorganised. There is no justihcation or operationalisation provided for what is 
considered a stressor or why the ones listed were chosen. For instance, one item deals 
with fatigue, ("I am less effective when stressed or fatigued"), another item deals with 
inexperience of other crewmembers ("A truly professional crewmember can leave 
personal problems behind when flying”). Two items include personal problems as a 
stressor ("Personal problems can adversely affect my performance" and "A truly 
professional crewmember can leave personal problems behind when flying"). Finally, 
two items ask respondents to cormnent on emergency situation as a stressor ("I am more 
likely to make judgement errors in emergency situations" and "My decision-making 
ability is as good in emergencies as in routine flying conditions"). Also, two of the items 
ask respondents to comment on particular aspects of their performance (effectiveness and 
decision making) while the remaining items require respondents to comment on their 
performance in general. The scale should be consistent in terms of the speciOc aspects of 
performance they are evaluating. Effectiveness is only one of many different aspects of
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performance. Secondly there are other key areas besides decision making that should be 
evaluated, including situational awareness, and teamwork.
There are any number of different stressors that exist within a pilots work 
environment, and rather than having items that appear to reflect random different 
stressors, the scale should include stressors that fall into spccihc categories and cover a 
cross secdon of those which are most often encountered in their work environment. For 
instance, the scale should address stressors which are environmental, physical, and 
psychological. Furthermore, improvements to the scale could be made by asking 
respondents to comment on their ability to recognise symptoms of stress that are both 
mental and physical. The focus of the stress recognition scale should be expanded to 
include more items that tap into the different facets of stress recognition such reporting 
stress or recognizing stress in other crewmembers.
Similar problems exist with the teamwork scale. In addidon to having a poorly 
defined construct, it attempts to measure a very broad aspect of teamwork with various 
individuals within the organizadon who do necessarily interact as a team. The biggest 
problem with the construct dednidon is that it requires respondents to comment on the 
quality of "teamwork" and "cooperadon". This is problemadc because cooperadon could 
be considered one pardcular facet of teamwork and not two parallel ideas or concepts. 
Furthermore "teamwork" is never defined. The scale could be improved in by narrowing 
the focus to either one specific facet such as cooperadon or include various different 
facets such as communicadon and leadership
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Another problem exists with the teamwork scale in that it requires respondents to 
rate the quality of teamwork and cooperation with personnel in which the nature of the 
teamwork based relationships would be different depending on the occupation. For 
example, the nature of teamwork that pilots experience with other cockpit crew would be 
inherently different than the teamwork they experience with maintenance personnel or 
gate agents. Beyond just the quality of cooperation, the amount of direct contact pilots 
have with gate agents and crew scheduling probably differs signihcantly from the amount 
of time pilots spend in direct contact with other cockpit crew and flight attendants.
Improvements to the teamwork subscale should start with the construct definition 
and increased specificity about how teamwork is defined and what aspects of teamwork 
is being measured (e.g. quality). The scale could also be improved by having people 
evaluate teamwork on the basis of the frequency and type of interpersonal interaction 
they have.
When an airline is interested in using the FMASS as an 
attitude assessment or training evaluation tool, they are provided with a generic scoring 
report. The report provides information on the items that make up each subscales, how to 
compute means for the subscales and the internal reliability for the entire scale (Wilhelm, 
Helmreich, & Merritt, 2001). There is also a technical report on the psychometric 
properties of the FMASS including reliabilities and factor structure (Sexton et al., 2001), 
however, when comparing the coding instructions for the FMASS there is conflicting 
information between the two reports. Instructions within the coding scheme suggest there
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are 29 items to the FMASS that make up six subscales, yet in the technical report (Sexton 
et al., 2001) states that there are 25 items that make up four subscales. Furthermore 
within the generic report four items appear in both the organisational culture subscale as 
well as the job attitudes. The information provided in the generic report does not indicate 
the difference between the FMAQ and the FMASS. The coding scheme in the generic 
report provides no information on the FMAQ or FMASS factor structure or other 
psychometric properties. In order to obtain this information, it must be requested from the 
authors in the form of the technical report (Sexton et al., 2001). The FMASS consists of 
25 items that load onto four separate factors, and 45 other items that are included despite 
the fact that they do not load on any factor. These items provide valuable qualitative 
information about attitudes towards other areas of flight management such following 
standard operating procedures. When following the generic report, a scoring key is 
provided for five subscales: safety culture, job attitudes, teamwork, stress recognition, 
and lastly a command and hierarchy scale. The very same scoring key is provided for 
both the FMAQ and the FMASS and the report specifically indicates a command 
subscale exists for both scales. The items, which are said to make up the command scale, 
are the same on both versions. Interestingly, the report written specifically on the FMASS 
(Sexton et al., 2001) does not include a command and hierarchy factor and the items are 
considered to be qualitative items. It is possible that there is a psychological construct 
relating to command and hierarchy however because of the wording of the items they are 
not factoring together. This subscale should be taken out of the generic report so that it
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matches the information provided in the technical report on the psychometric properties 
of the FMASS (Sexton et al., 2CK)1).
Moreover there are at least two different versions of the FMASS, the version used 
in the current study, and the version that is provided at the back of the generic report and 
the technical report (Sexton et al., 2001). These two different versions have the same 
name but do not contain the same number of items. It appears as though 17 qualitative 
items which were poorly worded, double barrelled, or contained typos were deleted from 
the questionnaire. Neither the generic report, nor the technical report indicate that a 
previous or earlier version of the FMASS was developed and neither report advises that 
these 17 items should not be considered in data analysis or as part of an airline’s 
assessment of safe flight management attitudes.
It is also possible that the current sample was unable to confirm the four-factor 
solution because a significant organisational change recently occurred. Pilots’ responses 
towards their level of safety culture, teamwork and in particular job attitudes may have 
been influenced by the shift in the organisation’s operations.
Because the current study used data previously collected by the 
involved airline there was no experimental control of how the sample was recruited and 
administered the survey. There was no control over instructions given to respondents and 
no control over the environment in which respondents completed the survey. Despite the 
large sample size the data was collected from one specific airline and may not be 
generalizable to other samples of Canadian pilots. The generalizbility of the results are
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limited due to the low levels of internal consistency, therefore, future research should be 
done using a different sample of Canadian pilots to ensure the results are not specific to 
this airline.
Further research should re-examine the theoretical foundation, development and 
validity of the proposed psychological constructs and the items. It is arguable whether the 
safety culture, job attitudes, teamwork and stress recognition are measuring an underlying 
construct or measuring attitudes toward disparate areas that only appear to tap into safety 
culture, job attitudes, stress recognition and teamwork. Because the FMASS is used as a 
training evaluation tool the most important next step in research would be to develop a 
new scale that more accurately measures the important components of safe flight 
management. In its current form the FMASS does not appear related to the goals of CRM 
training. Future research should re-evaluate the usefulness of the FMASS as an 
organisational assessment tool.
7/yyZicahonj. The implications of this study apply to both practical and research 
settings. The FMASS is a measure frequently within the aviation industry. It is used to 
assess the effectiveness of training and an organization's present attitudes towards flight 
safety management. The current study suggests that the reliability and validity of the 
scale are problematic. An unreliable and invalid measure of the proposed constructs 
poses problems to the industry as well as researchers. First, decisions around the 
effectiveness of CRM training may be impacted by the results of the FMASS and as such 
it is possible that incorrect conclusions about whether CRM is effective could be drawn. 
Furthermore airlines that use the FMASS to assess the current status of their organization
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could be mislead in that they are not measuring what the scale purports to measure. 
Researchers need to be careful and aware of the questionable reliability and validity of 
the FMASS especially when drawing conclusions about attitudes and performance. 
Sexton et al, (2001), briefly note the need for further research on the psychometric 
properties of the FMASS in their technical report, however this is not mentioned within 
the generic report that airlines receive as guide for analysing survey results. Airlines in 
particular should be made aware about the uncertainty of the validity and reliability of the 
FMASS so they are able to make appropriate decisions and conclusions about their 
organisation.
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MacMillian.
Salas, E., Fowlkes, J. E., Stout, R. J., Milanovich, D. M., & Prince, C. (1999). Does CRM 
training improve teamwork skills in the cockpit? Two evaluation studies. Homan 
Factors, 47, 326-343.
Salas, E., Prince, C., Bowers, C., Stout, R. J., Oser, R. L., &  Cannon-Bowers, J. A.
(1999). A methodology for enhancing crew resource management training. 
Homan Factors, 47, 161-172.
Salven, V. (2002, January). Hazardous Attitudes. FZane and Ft/ot Magazine. Retrieved 
from
httgV/www.planeandpilotmag.com/content/pastissues/2002/jan/hazardous.html 
Sexton, J. B., Wilhelm, J.A., Helmreich, RJ.., Merritt, A C., &  Klinect, JJR. (2001).
Flight management attitudes and safety survey (FMASS). A short version of the 
FMAQ. Hniverfity q/Texoj Homan Factor.; Fe^earc/i Frq/ect FecAnicai Report 
07-07. [Safety Culture OSU 2001.pdf].
Sexton, J.B., &  Klinect, J R. (2001). TTie Zin* between .;e^ty attitodef and o6ferved 
per^rmonce inyZig/zt operations, ll'^  International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology. Columbus OH.
Analysis of the FMASS 56
Shore, L. M .., Newton, L. A., & Thorton, G. C. (1990). Job and organizational attitudes 
in relation to employee 0 behavioural intentions. JowTTiaf OrgonizofionaZ 
ggAavmr, JJ, 57-67.
SPSS. (1999). SfSS 70 veryion. Chicago IL: SPSS Inc.
Tabachnick, B.G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). /Wfivwmfg jtoristicf. Toronto: Allyn &  
Bacon.
Trochim, W. M. (2004). The 7(g.ygorcA MetAodiy ÆhowWgg Bayg, 2^ Edition. Retrieved 
from httD://trochim.human.comell.edu/kb/index.htm (version current as of August 
16, 2004).
Wickens, C. D., Gordon, S. E., & Liu, Y. (1998). An /ntrodwction to Tfn/non Eoctorf 
Engineering, Ontario: Addison Wesley Longman Inc.
Wilhelm, J., Helmreich, R., & Merritt, A. (2001). A generic report for the flight
management attitudes questionnaire (FMAQ) and its variants. TTre [/niver.yi^ q  ̂
Texoe at AwJtin Hronan Factor.; Ee;earc/t Frq/ect TecAnicai Report 07-02. Austin 
TX.
Yule, S. (2003). Senior management irr^aence on sa/ety pe^rmance in tAe EE and ES 
energy ;ectorj. Doctoral thesis. University of Aberdeen, Scotland.
Analysis of the FMASS 57
Appendix A
Flightdeck Management and Safety Survey 
The success of this survey depends upon your contribution so it is hnportant that you answer 
questions as honestly as you can.
There are no right or wrong answers, and often the Grst answer that comes to mind is best. 
Individual responses are absolutely conRdential. If  you do not Oy an automated aircraft, 
leave the automation questions blank.
Part I  -  Pilot Views: This portion of the questionnaire asks you to express your perceptions of 
the company. Please answer by writing a letter beside each item horn the corresponding scale.
A B C D E
Very Low Low Adequate High Very High
A. Please evaluate your level of satisfaction with these B. Please describe your different
aspects of flight operations. Personal perception of the
Æ cocpg/aübn you
have experienced with;
1. Oualitv of new-hire training 14. Other cockpit
crewmembers
2. Ground school 15. Gate agents
3. Simulatœ-based training 16. Ramp personnel
4. Fairness of checking 17. Flight attendants
5. Flight standards & training overall 18. Dispatch
6. Chief pilot & assistant chief pilot availabilitv 19. Maintenance
7. Flight Operations management 20. Crew Scheduling
25. Please answer the following by writing a letter beside each item using the following
scale.
A B C D E
Disagree Strongly Disagree Slightly Neutral Agree Slightly Agree Strongly
_1. The managers in Flight Operations listen to us and care.
_2. Under ohnormaZ conditions, I can rapidly access the information I need in/hom the FMS. 
_3. Junior crewmembers should not question the captain's decisions.
_4. I am proud to work for this organization.
_5. My suggestions about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to managemenL 
_6. Senior management (VP and above) at our airline is doing a good job.
_7. Our pilots and flight attendants work together as a well-coordinated team.
_8. Crewmembers that I  fly with conçly with our airline's SOP's.
_9. I think that it is ingxxtant to make sure other crewmembers acknowledge my changes to 
system SOP's.
_10. Pilot morale is high.
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_11. Checklists should only check critical "safety of flight" items -  the rest can be 
accomplished with flow patterns.
_12. Pilots trust senior management at our airline.
_13. Safety at this airline is better now than three years ago.
_14. I like my job.
_15. I believe that the beneSts of the required before takeoff briefings are overstressed.
_16. The captain should take physical control and fly the aircraft in emergency and non-standard 
situation.
_17. I prefer flying automated aircraft.
_18. Captains should encourage crewmember questions during normal flight operations and in 
emergencies.
_19. It is okay to violate SOP's, as long as the plane lands smoothly and on-time.
_20. The company's rules (policies and SOP's) should not be broken -  even when the employee 
thinks it is in the airline's best interests.
_21. Good communication and crew cowdination are as important as technical proGciency for 
flight safety.





Slightly Neutral Agree Slightly Agree Strongly
_23. My decision-making ability is as good in 
emergencies as in routine flying 
conditions.
_24. Successful flight deck management is 
primarily a function of the captain's 
flying proficiency.
_25. Crewmembers should not question 
actions of the captain except when they 
threaten the safety of the flight.
_26. Management will never compromise 
safety concerns for profitability.
_27.1 am less effective when stressed or 
fatigued.
_28. I was trained to always use the highest 
level of automation.
_29. An essential captain duty is to improve 
the skills of first officers.
_30. My performance is not adversely affected 
by working with an inexperienced or less 
capable crewmember.
_31. Automated cockpits require more cross­
checking of crewmember actions.
_32. Personal problems can adversely affect 
my performance.
_33. A truly professional crewmember can 
leave personal problems behind when 
flying.
_34. I am encouraged by my supervisors and 
co-workers to report any unsafe 
conditions I may observe.
_35. Except for total incapacitation of the 
captain, the flrst officer should never 
assume command of the aircraft.
_36. Written procedures are necessary for all 
in-flight situaticms.
_37.1 know the proper channels to report my 
safety concerns.
_38. Working here is like being part of a large 
family.
_39. Crewmembers should mention their stress 
or physical problems to other 
crewmembers before or during a flight.
_40. The captain's responsibilities include 
coordination.
_41. If I perceive a problem with the flight, I 
will speak up, regardless of who might be 
affected.
_42. Effective crew coordination requires 
crewmembers to consider the personal 
work styles of other crewmembers.
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_43. I feel embarrassed when I make a mistake 
in hront of others.
_44. It is difficult to know what FMS 
operations the other crewmember is
performing, without discussion.
_45.1 am more likely to make judgment errors 
in abnormal or emergency situations.
_46.1 believe that the benefits of the required 
approach briefing are overstressed.
_47.1 am concerned that the use of automation 
will cause me to lose flying skills.
_48.1 look forward to more automation -  the 
more the better.
_49. Sterile cockpit SOP is unrealistic and 
overstressed.
_50. Even when tired, I perform effectively
during critical, high workload phases of a
flight.
_51. There are modes and features of the FMS 
that I do not fully understand.
_52. My company expects me to always use 
the highest level of automation.
_53. My situational awareness suffers when 1 
am fatigued.
_54.1 let other crewmembers know when my 
workload is becoming (or about to 
become) excessive.
_55. We currently receive too much CRM 
training.
_56. Non-jeopardy line observations are a 
good means of collecting operations and 
safety data/information.
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Part n  -  Background Information
 Gender (M or F)  Base  Years at current airline Years in Aviation
_______________ Current Fleet (A/C type & series) Years in position (this aircraft)
Flying background (check one)  Military  Civilian Both
Crew Position:  C A  FO  F/A
Status:  Line Pilot Instructor CAT "A " CAT "B"  Management Other
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questioimaire. Your participation is appreciated
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Appendix B 
Inter-Item Correlation Table
l.The 4 . 1 am 5. My 6 10 12. Pilots trust 14 26. 2 7 .1 am 32. Personal
managers proud to suggestions Senior Pilot senior I like my Management less problems can
in Flight work for about safety mgmt at morale is management job will never effective affect
Operations this would be our high at our airline compromise when performance
listen to us organization acted upon airline is safety stressed




1. The managers in Flight
Operations listen to us and
care 1
4 . 1 am proud to work for
this organization .389** 1
5. My suggestions about
safety would be acted upon .508** .417** 1
6. Senior at our airline is
doing a good job .422** .545** .341** 1
10. Pilot morale is high .229** .414** .232** .407** 1
12. Pilots trust senior
management at our airline .364** .389** .372** .564** .491** 1
14 .1 like my Job .271** .552** .303** .295** .286** .252** 1
26. Management will never .289**
compromise safety .199** .323** .212** .183** .332** .188** 1
2 7 .1 am less effective 1
when stressed or fatigued -.124** -.032 -.060 -.025 .066 -.052 .003 -.173** 1
32. Personal problems can
affect my performance -.124** -.151* -.027 -.080* -.141** -.070 -.075 -.144** .257** 1
34.1 am encouraged to
report any unsafe
conditions .335** .298** .402** .272** .144** .259** .202** .185** .013 .029
37.1 know the proper
channels to report my
safety concerns .304** .182** .279** .157** .041 .182** .145** .145** -.012 .036





listen to us 
and care








































38. Working here is
like being part of a 
large family .326** .403** .296** .345** .273** .315** .324** .189** -.023 -.103**
45.1 am more likely
to make judgment 
errors in abnormal or 
emergency situation -.047 .026 -.053 .000 .044 -.013 .010 -.112** .015 .184**
scq23 reverse scored -.049 -.033 -.051 .014 -.054 -.057 -.059 -.115** .097* .182**
scq30 reverse scored -.103** -.055 -.101** -.116** -.117** -.102** -.102** -.140** -.112** .193**
scq33 reverse scored -.066 -.027 -.026 -.061 -.110** -.092* -.040 -.132** .039 .310**
6. Chief pilot & 
assistant chief pilot 
availability .446** .267** .382** .326** .145** .267** .170** .204** -.042 -.066
14. Other cockpit
crew members .137** .187** .215** -.093* -.089* .058 .178** .056
.010
.062
15. Gate agents .211** .222** .170** .222** -.129** .140** .141** .100** .048 .042
16. Ramp Personnel .249** .229** .194** .305** .153** .212** .132** .093* .022 .031
17. Flight 
Attendants .089* .168** .145** -.119** .092* .036 .135**
.041
.003 -.071
18. Dispatch .244** .271 -.259** -.196** -.157** .150** .216** .147** .028 .042
19. Maintenance .171** .175** -.224** -.162** -.166** .131** .159** .137** .043 .070
20. Crew 
Scheduling .332** .267** .226** .216** .169** .155** .202** .139** -.029 .105**
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34.1 am 3 7 .1 know 38. 4 5 .1 am C23. My C30. My C33.A 6. Chief p ilo t* 14. Other
encourage the proper Working more likely decision performance is professional assistant chief pilot cockpit crew
d to report channels to here is like to make making not affected by crew availability members
any unsafe report my being part judgment ability is working with member can
conditions safety of a large errors good in less capable leave personal
concerns family emergency
situations
emergencies crewmembers problems behind
3 4 .1 am encouraged to 1
report unsafe
conditions
3 7 .1 know the proper
channels to report
safety concerns .326** 1
38. Working here is
like being part of a
large family
.206** .208** 1
45 .1 am likely to make
judgment errors in
emergency situations .004 -.034 -.005 1
C23. My decision
making ability is good
in emergencies -.026 -.050 -.074 .427** 1
C30. My performance
is not affected by 1
working with less
capable crewmembers .042 -.064 -.077 .240** .190** 1
C33. A professional
crew
member can leave -.058 .009 -.086* .157** .216** .211** 1
personal problems
behind
6. Chief pilot &
assistant chief pilot .309** .312** .201** -.072 -.031 -.068 -.078* 1
availability
14. Other cockpit
crew members .105** .047 .154** -.032 -.033 -.041 .026 .190** 1
15. Gate agents .203** .157** .136** -.018 -.047 -.012 -.027 .191** .110**
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3 4 .1 am 3 7 .1 know 38. 4 5 .1 am C23.My C30. My C33. A 6. Chief pilot & 14. Other
encourage the proper Working more likely decision performance is professional assistant chief pilot cockpit crew
d to report channels to here is like to make making not affected by crew availability members
any unsafe report my being part judgment ability is working with member can
conditions safety of a large errors good in less capable leave personal
concerns family emergency emergencies crewmembers problems behind
situations
16. Ramp Personnel .170** .196* .194** -.003 -.010 -.055 -.026 .206** .094*
17. Flight Attendants .068 .027 .119** -.079* -.094* -.059 -.049 .124** .472**
18. Dispatch .181** .054 .159** -.036 -.058 -.106** -.032 .262** .241**
19. Maintenance .142** .053 .131** -.048 -.034 -.073 .039 .245** .239**
20. Crew Scheduling .191** .068 .221** -.064 .040 -.067 -.005 .346** .191**
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15. Gate 16. Ramp 17. Flight 18. 19. 20. Crew
agents Personnel Attendants Dispatch Maintenance Scheduling
15. Gate agents 1
16. Ramp Personnel .529** 1
17. Flight Attendants .103** .141** 1
18. Dispatch .167** .059 .236** 1
19. Maintenance .113** .092* .199** .482** 1
20. Crew Scheduling .222** .141** .128** .493** .357** 1
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Appendix C 
Tests for Group Effects 
Results of the MANOVA showed that there was an overall multivariate effect of base, F  
(3, 553) = 11.17, p <.001. The results for the tests of between sulÿects indicate that there 
were significant univariate effects of base on the safety culture, job attitudes and 
teamwork scales. Post hoc analyses show that base Halifax was significantly different 
from base Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver on all three subscales. In addition, post hoc 
tests show that Toronto and Vancouver were significantly different from each other on 
the teamwork scale. The extent to which group differences impacted the factor structure 
of the FMASS was not examined due to sample size constraints.
